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Definitions 
• Safety is the freedom from unaccepted risk 
• Hazard: “potential source of harm” 
• Risk = Probability * Severity 
• Harm:  “physical injury or damage to health or 
property” 
 
 ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002 
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Definitions 
State of the Art is 
 the level of development (as of a device, 
procedure, process, technique, or science) 
reached at any particular time usually as a 
result of modern methods  
 
Marriam-Webster (1910) 
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State of the Art 
Pre-normative 
Research 
Performance based, 
Risk informed 
Standards & Regulation 
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Consortium 
● 24 partners from 12 European countries  
incl. Russia (Kurchatov Institute) and  
one Canadian partner (University of Calgary) 
● 13 public research organisations, 7 industrial partners,  
5 universities 
● ~150 scientists involved 
Time schedule 
network/project start:    03/2004 
subsidised max. duration:   5 years 
  02/2009 activities transferred to the  
    International Association “HySafe” 
Budget 
Total > 13 M€ with a EC grant of max. 7 M€ 
State-of-the-Art 
Coordinated Research (NoE HySafe) 
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Int Conference on 
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e-Academy 
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RC&S 
Yearly planning and reporting 
 Strategy „International Association for Hydrogen Safety“  
 
Jointly Excecuted 
Research Activities 
 
Management 
Website Strategies Business Plan 
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Mat compatibility, 
structural integrity 
WP6. (FZK) 
Numerical 
Tools 
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CEN/CENELEC 
StorHy 
HyWays 
NATURALHY 
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America 
Japan 
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State-of-the-Art 
Experimental Facilities (HySafe-IEF) 
only 6 out of > 100 
Belfast, 30th September 2008 Progress in Hydrogen Safety – Hydrogen Safety SoA – T. Jordan 10 
SBEP V3 (Dispersion)  
240g H2 into „garage“  
SBEP V2 (Deflagration) 
20m hemisphere (Fh-ICT test) 
State-of-the-Art 
Numerical Tools (HySafe-NT) 
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(Partially) Confined Releases 
Mitigation 
have been determined by   
- initial PIRT study 
   - expert questionnaire 
- state-of-the-art survey 
communicate the network’s working topics, 
orientate the work on intermediate time 
scale (proposals for experiments, 
benchmarking, Internal Projects …) 
State-of-the-Art 
Pre-normative research directions  
(HySafe WP7) 
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Iterative process of risk assessment 
and risk reduction 
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Risk Assessment 
Some Elements 
Source: TÜV Rheinland 
Some established methods for 
safety analyses 
More qualitative methods More quantitative methods 
-Fault tree analysis 
-Fault sequence analysis 
-Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis FMEA 
- Check list method 
-Preliminary hazard identification 
-What if method 
-Hazard identification amd 
Operability HAZOP 
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Hazard Identification  
HAZOP 
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Hazard Identification 
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• -253°C  cold burns, material degradation, NDTT 
• 780 x volume expansion during evaporation  asphyxiation 
• cryo pump effect in open LH2 pools  condensing air,  
  spontaneous ignitions 
 
Hazard Identification 
Specific issues of LH2 
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Hazard Identification 
Based on experience 
Stockholm 1984 
H2-Source 180 Nm
3 
16 injuries, damage on  
vehicles and buildings 
in a radius of 90 m 
Köln 2005 Norwegen 1984 
Detonation of ~5 kg,  
2 fatalities, 
Destruction of the 
whole industry 
building 
What if …? 
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> 250 H2 specific events 
Hazard Identification 
Collection of event versions in HIAD 
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Administration & Risk “environment” 
Where (application, environment,…) 
Technical specification of the event 
Equipment spec, location,…. 
Hazardous Event Specification 
What happened and why 
Hazardous Event Consequences Specification 
Fatalities, injuries, property damage, … 
Hazard Identification 
Incidence and Accidents Database 
(HIAD) Structure 
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Hazard Identification 
Some conclusions from statistics 
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Injured 
Fatalities 
• Considerably less injured with LH2 / GH2, but same fatalities 
• All combustion phenomena occur, depending on many parameters 
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CONSEQUENCE 
ANALYSIS 
Mechanical and 
thermal loads  
Structural  
Effects 
CRITERIA FOR  
HAZARD  
POTENTIAL 
Flammability 
yes 
yes 
Flame Acceleration  
yes 
COMBUSTIBLE 
MIXTURE 
GENERATION 
e.g. GASFLOW 
e.g. FLAME3D 
Fast turbulent 
deflagration  
e.g. COM3D 
Detonation 
e.g. DET3D 
Slow deflagration 
response 
e.g. SDO, 
ABAQUS 
Detonation- 
transition 
Problem geometry 
Mitigation 
Scenario 
Sources 
Distribution 
e.g. GP-Program 
COMBUSTION 
SIMULATION 
State of the Art Consequence Modelling 
Analysis Methodology 
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COMBUSTIBLE 
MIXTURE 
GENERATION 
Problem geometry 
Mitigation 
Scenario 
Sources 
Distribution 
State of the Art Consequence Modelling 
Mixture Generation 
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GENERIC ARCHITECTURE OF AN LH2-TANK SYSTEM 
Source: EU-Project EIHP-2, Final Report 2004 
CRACK! 
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INVESTIGATED GARAGE SCENARIOS 
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CASE HYDROGEN SOURCE GEOMETRY 
• A thermal energy deposition of 1 Watt into a cryogenic LH2-tank leads to a  
  boil-off of 170 g of gaseous hydrogen per day 
 
• Assume here 5 release pulses per day, 34 g H2 each, with two different release rates 
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WHAT ARE THE IMPORTANT RISK DETERMINING PARAMETERS? 
• Large spectrum of events possible, ranging from zero risk to destruction 
  of garage 
 
• What are the parameters influencing the outcome of such a leak scenario? 
- H2 release rate 
- total H2 mass released 
- venting 
- garage volume 
- … 
- ignition source 
- scale of combustible  
  cloud 
- obstacles 
- confinement 
- turbulence 
- … 
- pressure loads 
- temperature 
- loads 
- … 
- effects on structures 
- effects on people 
- … 
• Obvious first step is to understand mixture generation, defines initial and  
   boundary conditions for further accident development 
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GASFLOW SIMULATION OF GARAGE SCENARIO 
Isosurface with  4 vol% H2, depicts flammable mixture in garage 
• Case 1: release rate 3.4 g H2 / s for 10 seconds 
volume fraction H2 
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GASFLOW SIMULATION OF GARAGE SCENARIO 
Isosurface with  4 vol% H2 , depicts flammable mixture in garage 
• Case 2: release rate 0.34 g H2 / s for 100 seconds 
volume fraction H2 
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Resulting Hydrogen Cloud 
in the garage 
• Computed dimension of combustible  
   H2-air cloud in garage (4…75% H2) 
 
 
• Characteristic size of combustible cloud 
   expressed as dCC = (Vcc)
1/3 
 
 
• Combustible cloud size strongly dependent 
   on release rate, is result of balance between 
   source strength and sinks, or release 
   rate and mixing mechanisms 
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What is the risk from a combustible cloud ? 
Case 1 Case 2 
• How would you judge the hazard in both cases? 
• Who would switch on lights in the garage? 
• What physical quantities determine the hazard potential  
   of a combustible H2-air cloud? 
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State-of-the-Art CFD code Verification 
Based on HySafe SBEPs 
Report FZKA-7085 (2005), www.fzk.de/hbm 
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Mixing classification 
• Extreme thermodynamic states  
   (20K, 80 MPa) 
• Compressibility 
• Buoyancy 
• Diffusion 
• Phase changes 
- Condensing gases (H2, H20, air, 
etc) 
- Evaporating liquids (H2, H20…) 
• Multiple components 
• Gradient mixtures 
• Turbulence 
• Frictional and electrostatic effects 
• Heat transfer 
Main phenomena and processes which has 
to be considered in mixing simulations 
including their coupling  
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• Jet Releases 
Free, slow, vertical upwards 
Cold 
Fast 
Horizontal 
Wall attached 
Multiphase 
Cross-wind 
Discharge coefficients 
 
• LH2 pools 
Heat transfer (soil, gases) 
Condensing air 
  
• Diffusion 
       Gravitational effects 
 
State of the Art in Gas Mixing  
Open issues vs established techniques 
Models: 
  Conservation equation of fluid flow 
(fully compressible, 3-dim, Navier- 
Stokes) 
  Thermophysical properties of 
components (JANAF, internal 
energy, specific heats, for all 
relevant components including two-
phase water) 
  Molecular transport coefficients 
(CHEMKIN, thermal conductivity, 
dynamic viscosity, binary diffusion 
coefficients) 
  Convective and radiative heat 
transfer between gas and structure 
  Heat conduction within structures 
  Condensation and vaporization of 
water (film, droplets, sump) 
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• Permeation releases 
Particle vs Continuum  
 
• Turbulent transport 
Turbulence models for middle sized scenarios 
Parameters for high pressure, cryogenic gases 
Gravitational effects on turbulent transport 
Wall effects 
Complex geometries 
Turbulent dissipation 
 
• Multi-phase transport 
Droplet, dust, gas interaction  
 
 
State of the Art in Gas Mixing 
Open issues vs established techniques 
Models: 
Boundary layer model for wall 
shear stress 
  Turbulence modeling  
(algebraic, k-e, LES, effects on 
molecular transport coefficients) 
At least lumped parameter models 
for accident mitigation measures 
(recombiner and igniter models, 
liquid sumps,…) 
  Ventilation systems (ducts, pipes, 
junctions, blowers, dampers, 
valves, filters, etc.) 
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State of the Art in Jet Modelling 
Free vertical upward jet 
Temperature Turbulence 
3D simulation of the head of H2 jet in air 
Turbulence: LES Smagorinsky 
Fine grid 
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Eternal problem: spatial resolution 
e.g. downward release into a cavity  
09 Sept. 2008 14 CEG-SAM Meeting, Kiev, Ukr ine 
7 mm LES 1 mm LES 7 mm RANS 
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CRITERIA FOR  
HAZARD  
POTENTIAL 
Flammability 
yes 
yes 
Flame Acceleration  
yes 
COMBUSTIBLE 
MIXTURE 
GENERATION 
e.g. GASFLOW 
Detonation- 
transition 
Problem geometry 
Mitigation 
Scenario 
Sources 
Distribution 
e.g. GP-Program 
State of the Art Consequence Modelling 
Criteria for Hazard Potential 
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Transient phenomena 
Cross-over of combustion regimes 
5 
Laminar deflagration 
 
v = 8 m/s, Ma << 1 
Fast turbulent 
 deflagration 
 v = 850 m/s, Ma  1 
 Detonation 
 
D = 1970 m/s, Ma >1 
Schlieren images of different combustion regimes 
M. Kuznetsov et al 
  DDT FA 
Ignitio
n 
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overpressure ratio (p-p)/p 
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Combustion Consequence   
Overpressure 
• The maximum flame speed generally governs the damage 
potential 
• Which combustion regime for given mixture and geometry? 
• How fast can it burn? 
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Flame Acceleration FA 
Conservative conditions for flame acceleration in hydrogen mixtures  
were investigated in closed obstructed tubes, e.g. FZK 12m-tube  
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D
flame velocity (m/s) 
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• Lean hydrogen mixtures in obstructed  
   tubes    with different tube diameters D 
  and 60% blockage ratio (BR) 
• Two distinct regimes with slow and fast    
   flame propagation are observed 
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Belfast, 30th September 2008 Progress in Hydrogen Safety – Hydrogen Safety SoA – T. Jordan 42 
FA criterion 
Influence of confinement   
S.B. Dorofeev et al, KI/FZK 
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• Summary of experiments with different  
   H2-O2- dilutend (N2, Ar, He) mixtures 
   in obstructed tubes of different 
   scales 
• Each point represents one 
  experiment 
• Results of data evaluation:  
   expansion ratio s of mixture is 
   is mixture property which governs  
   flame acceleration limit 
• No flame acceleration for  
   s < 3.75  0.1 
  (10.5% H2 in dry air) 
S.B. Dorofeev et al, KI/FZK 
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accelerating flame DDT stable (quasi)
detonation
spark 
ignition
p
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burned gas
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shock
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Deflagration-to-Detonation-Transition DDT 
• Two different modes of DDT have been 
   observed 
- shock focussing 
- detonation on-set in turbulent  
  flame brush 
 
• Present here are one example for DDT 
  with pressure wave emitted from 
  an obstructed region and focussed  
  in a conus  
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DDT criterion   
Detonation cell size 
Cell sizes for H2-air mixtures at 
various initial temperatures 
Detonation cell sizes  depend on 
mixture composition and initial 
conditions 
Experimental data and models are 
available for  evaluation 
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• Correlation of all experimental  
  data with given definitions of D  
  and detonation cell size data  
  shows that detonations are  
  only possible for D/ > 7 
• Current uncertainty in detonation  
  cell size   factor 2 
D/  
• Experiments on DDT in differently sized and shaped facilities have shown that a certain  
  minimum scale is required for DDT 
• In accident scenarios D/ can vary  
  by orders of magnitude, criterion  
  has predictive capability 
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7λ-criterion  
Critical conditions for onset of detonations in 
rooms and channels with obstacles (mixtures with 
irregular cellular structure) 
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Summary of Criteria 
Criteria for possible occurrence of fast combustion regimes  
were evaluated from many experiments on different scales 
• Transition phenomena cannot be modeled numerically on large 
building scale 
• Criteria allow selection of fastest possible combustion mode from 
computed H2-air cloud composition and scale 
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Computed Hazard Parameters 
for selected garage scenario 
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• Risk parameters show strong dependence on H2 release rate 
 
- Case 1: 
   (3.4 g H2/s) 
 
 Only Case 1 followed in further safety analysis 
• Contineous potential for slow deflagration 
   ( 20 g of 34 g)  
• potential for supersonic combustion regimes 
  during the release period 
• high release rate not tolerable without mitigation  
  measures 
 
• only small potential for slow deflagrations, natural 
  mixing processes sufficient 
 
• release rate (and mass) seems tolerable for 
  present garage design 
 
- Case 2: 
  (0.34 g H2/s) 
Computed Hazard Parameters 
for selected garage scenario 
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CRITERIA FOR  
HAZARD  
POTENTIAL 
Flammability 
yes 
yes 
Flame Acceleration  
yes 
COMBUSTIBLE 
MIXTURE 
GENERATION 
e.g. GASFLOW 
Fast turbulent 
deflagration  
Detonation 
Slow deflagration 
Detonation- 
transition 
Problem geometry 
Mitigation 
Scenario 
Sources 
Distribution 
e.g. GP-Program 
COMBUSTION 
SIMULATION 
State of the Art Consequence Modelling 
Analysis Methodology 
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Unconfined Tests  
with the Combustion Unit 
• Peak overpressure and impulse 
  measured as function of distance 
  to characterize blast effects from 
  combustion unit 
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Flame speeds in the Combustion Unit 
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• The flame acceleration inside the combustion units measured with photodiodes 
• For 8 and 16 g H2 detonation speeds are obtained at the outer edge of the cube 
center of  
the cube 
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Simulation of Unconfined Tests 
• The unconfined tests with different combustion units were simulated  
 (with COM3D in this case) 
• The combustion model was fit to the measured flame speed  
 in the combustion units 
• The calculated peak overpressures agree with the experimental  
 values and follow Sachs scaling 

p
m
a
x
+
/p
0
 
R (p0 / E)
1/3 
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Combustion experiments for Case 1 
• Up to 20 g of hydrogen would be in  
 burnable concentrations 
 
 
• A significant part of this could potentially burn  
 with high flame speeds 
 
 
• What would be pressure loads and consequences  
 from a local explosion in the garage? 
 
 
• Outcome uncertain, experiments performed in  
 test chamber simulating the garage 
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Local H2 Explosions in a “Garage” 
Experiment 
with 8g H2 
H2 - 
mass: 
 
-   1g 
-   2g 
-   4g 
-   8g 
- 16g 
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Instrumentation of the „Garage“ 
The instrumentation included pressure and acceleration sensors  
at different locations, covering flat surfaces, (2d) edges and (3d) corners 
Pressure sensors 
Acceleration 
ors 
location of combustion unit 
Height (cm) 
Width (cm) 
Length (cm)  
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Comparison of Overpressures 
• Pressure sensor 2 B, 
  floor near combustion unit 
• Pressure sensor 8 A, 
  back wall, half wall height 
• Pressure signals very consistent in timing, amplitudes increase systemarically with H2 mass, 
  reproducible pattern of reflected pressure waves in confined volume. 
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Reproducibility of Measured Data 
• The experiment with 1 g H2 
  was performed three times 
 
• Acceleration and pressure 
  sensors show very good  
  reproducibility of measured 
  signals 
 
• Complex, but reproducible 
  pressure waves are created 
  in confined local explosions 
  of H2-air mixtures 
2 
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COM3D State-of-the-Art Combustion 
Simulation 
3d pressure field, calculated isosurface for 1.1 bar 
Test  
with 8g H2 
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Comparison of Overpressures 
Good agreement, remaining differences are due to geometry simplification  
and rigid wall model in simulation 
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State-of-the-Art Reactive CFD Validation 
Large scale experiments (HySafe SBEPs)  
    performed in RUT facility near Moscow  
(FZK, CEA, partly NRC), H2-air, H2-air-steam 
- Total length 62 m 
- Total volume 480 m3 
- First channel with obstacles 
- Second part without obstacles 
RRC KI 1995 – 2002: RUT-2200 
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A. Kotchourko, IKET 
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Numerical simulation of RUT experiments with hydrogen-air and  
hydrogen-air steam mixtures.  
Standard k-e and Eddy-Break-up model. 
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State-of-the-Art Reactive CFD Validation 
Large scale experiments  
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Impinging jet flame 
Side View 
Coarse grid 
Modeling of the H2 impinging jet 
Injection time 200 ms 
Top View 
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Combustion classification 
• Ignition 
• Combustion in different regimes 
• Initial conditions 
- Mixture composition 
- Turbulence 
- Gradients (e.g., concentration) 
• Boundary conditions 
- Obstructions 
- Confinement 
- Heat Transfer 
- Turbulence 
Main phenomena and processes which has to be 
considered in combustion simulations due to their 
strong influence on combustion/explosion 
consequences 
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• Ignition 
Weak / Mild ignition (e.g., spark, gloving plug,  
  igniter, recombiner) 
Strong ignition (e.g., spark, high explosives,  
  ignition in reflections) 
Jet ignition 
 
• Combustion mode 
Laminar combustion  
Flame acceleration / deceleration 
Turbulent deflagration 
DDT 
Detonation 
Quenching 
Local quenching 
Global quenching 
Standing flames and fires 
 
State of the Art in Combustion  
Open issues vs established techniques 
Models: 
Turbulence models 
 Standard k-ε model 
 RNG k-ε model 
 LES with SGS models: 
 Smagorin ki [Deardorff, 1970] 
 mixed [Biringen, 1981] 
 dynamic [Germano, 1991] 
 approximate deconvolution method 
(ADM)  
 
Eddy-Break-Up model 
  EDM 
  Set of phenomenological 
combustion models (CREBCOM, 
HEAVDET, etc)  
  Presumed β-PDF 
  1D PDF (f) 
  joint PDF (at least 2D: f, T) 
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• Spatial and time resolution 
• Initial conditions 
Mixture composition 
Initial concentrations, release rates 
Fuel additives: Carbon monoxide / Hydrocarbons 
Combustion inhibitors: Steam / Carbon dioxide 
Initial turbulence 
Gradients (concentration, temperature, etc) 
• Boundary conditions 
Obstructions 
Large scale obstructions (resolved: same size as 
the characteristic size of the problem) 
Small scale obstructions (unresolved: much less 
than the characteristic size of the problem) 
Confinement 
 Closed   
 Vented / Semi-confined and open 
Additional sources of turbulence (fans, jets, etc) 
State of the Art in Combustion  
Open vs established issues and established 
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CONSEQUENCE 
ANALYSIS 
Mechanical and 
thermal loads  
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State of the Art Consequence Modelling 
Structural response 
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Maximum Overpressures vs Distance 
• Measured peak overpressures p+ in unconfined tests with combustion units  
 of 0.5 to 16 g H2  
• Data are well reproducible 
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 Measured positive impulse I+ values from unconfined 
   combustion units 
Impulse vs Distance 
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 What are effects of blast loads on the structure? 
Commercial systems like LS-DYNA, PAMCRASH, etc… 
State of the Art Consequence Modelling 
Structural response 
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Limiting Pressure Loads  
on Structural Elements  
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Limiting Pressure Loads  
on Humans  
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The proposed analysis procedure allows identification  
of possible mitigation measures for risk reduction 
• Exlude severe scenarios by design changes 
• Limit hydrogen sources 
• Support hydrogen dispersion  
 and mixing processes 
• Exclude ignition sources 
• Suppress flame acceleration 
  (low confinement and turbulence generation) 
• Avoid detonation transition processes 
  (lean mixtures, small scale) 
• Confine consequences (strong enclosure) 
 
 Accident 
progression 
If this level of 
defence 
has been 
optimized, work 
on next barrier for 
accident 
progression 
Mitigation Measures 
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Mitigation by Steam Inerting 
Flame acceleration limit
p0 = 0.1 MPa
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• safe venting of compressed hydrogen gas cylinders (35 and 70 MPa), 
• optimum arrangement of H2 storage vessels in the vehicle, 
• fire safety of hydrogen-powered vehicles with the primary goal to prevent bursting 
of the high-pressure hydrogen system (flamelets impingement, PRDs,..) 
• guidelines for fire fighters in case of fire or accident, 
• optimum number and location of hydrogen detectors, 
• safety concept in case of a hydrogen leak detection in a running car, 
• tolerable H2 leak rates in the vehicle for different operating conditions, including a 
parked car, 
• optimum position and activation criteria for pressure relief devices on the H2 tank, 
• procedures to prevent penetration of hydrogen into the passenger compartment, 
• effectiveness of forced ventilation for reducing local H2 concentrations in sensitive 
car areas, 
• maximum possible reduction of ignition sources, 
• development of standardised safety test procedures for new solid storage 
materials, such as nanocrystalline powders. 
• development of non-destructive testing methods for cryo-vessels and high 
pressure tanks made from composite materials including highly accelerated 
lifetime testing. 
State of the Art in H2 Vehicle Safety  
Open issues 
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Some Simplified Methods 
Risk Evaluation with FMEA 
RBZ = A * B * E 
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Some Simplified Methods 
Risk Evaluation with FMEA 
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• Simplest model for structural 
response is SDO model 
• Describes ground mode (first 
harmonic) of structural element 
which is represented by lumped 
values for mass, stiffness and 
damping of motion 
• Tool to understand basic effects of 
transient pressure loads on global 
displacement of element 
• In FEM analysis also higher 
modes included, but superposition 
of different effects, results not so 
transparent 
r max 
k 
p(t) 
m 
t 
D 
Some Simplified Methods 
Single-DOF-Oscillator model for structural response 
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• Use of Sachs scaling collapses measured peak overpressures  
  to universal correlation for  1 g H2, E = total energy of explosive charge 
• Combustion units provide conservative overpressures 
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Scaled Peak Overpressures vs Distance 
TNT Equivalence, Multi-energy methods,… 
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(Partially) Confined Releases 
Mitigation 
determined by   
- initial PIRT study 
   - expert questionnaire 
- state-of-the-art survey 
communicate the network’s working 
topics, 
orientate the work on intermediate time 
scale (proposals for experiments, 
benchmarking, Internal Projects …) 
Expanding the State of the Art  
(Pre-normative) Research Directions 
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HySafe Internal Project “InsHyde”  
Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
• Investigation of realistic non-catastrophic releases in 
(partially) confined areas 
• Determination of permeation and release limits 
• Systematic assessment of mitigation  
(including detection) measures  
(sensors + venting + recombiner...) 
• Simulations and experiments  
for critical releases 
• Deriving „Recommendations“,  
→ standards, ... 
• Proposing a dedicated  
project for JTI support 
“HyGarage” (lead NCSRD) 
 Garage facility at partner CEA 
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• Released mass of  Hydrogen: - 1-10 g (Standard variation) 
• Release time:   - 0.1-100 s (Jet  Plume) 
• Ignition time:   - to be chosen in a way, that presumably 
• Ignition location:    maximum H2- combustion occurs 
• Ignition energy:   - weak, strong  
• Complexity of geometry 
 a) Obstacles:   - different number of wire netting layers 
        turbulence and flame convolution 
 b) Enclosure:   - different number of restrictive plates 
       (i.e. aluminum) 
1/6 3/6 5/6 6/6 
 
 
Obstructed area / 
Total area 
HySafe Internal Project “InsHyde”  
Definition of acceptable inventories 
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m = 0.15 g/s, 
hign = 0.45 m  
m = 3.0 g/s, 
hign = 0.8 m 
m = 6.0 g/s, 
hign = 0.8 m  
“InsHyde” Integral tests (10 g)  
D = 21mm 
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Mixture degree is dependent on 
• Release time 
• Enclosure  
• Obstacles 
  all in Deliverable D113 
(to be published) 
 
0 5 10 
realistic 
upper limit 
little realistic 
upper limit 
increasing 
mixture degree 
mH2 (g) 
Q 
pmax 
0 5 10 
mH2 (g) 
Q 
pmax  
weak ignition strong ignition 
increasing 
mixture degree 
Example:  
Effect of enclosure (1-6 Sides) 
p 
Upper limit 
6 
5 
3 
1 
3 
1 
6 
5 
m1 m2 
plimit 
plimit 
“InsHyde” Some Results   
mH2 (g) 
Belfast, 30th September 2008 Progress in Hydrogen Safety – Hydrogen Safety SoA – T. Jordan 86 
“InsHyde” – Permeation  
Survey on Existing Allowable Rates 
  all in Deliverable D113 
(to be publishe ) 
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HySafe Internal Project “HyTunnel”  
 
 
 
 
 
→ Improved Tunnel Safety  
with H2 as the fuel of the 
future 
- Selection of broadly 
accepted szenarios. 
- Review of available 
relevant numerical and 
experimental simulations 
- Qualitative assessment 
on  standard mitigation 
measures effectiveness 
(benchmark) 
i. Experimental part 
(depending on financing) 
ii.Extension of the EC 
Tunnel „directives“ 
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I – ignition point; 
P, I – pressure and light gauges.  
L = 12 m – A1 length; 
D = 3.5 m – A1 diameter; 
V = 100 m3 (+30 m3)– total volume; 
BR = 0.6 (0.3) by obstacle laden grid  
 
CH2 –hydrogen concentration; 
– layer thickness 
• Objective: Critical conditions for FA and DDT in semi-
confined gas mixture layer 
• Expected data: Dependence of critical σ* and λ*  
on gas layer thickness δ 
“HyTunnel” - Experimental Layout   
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Large scale facility (5.7 x 1.6 x 0.6 m) 
- effective venting ratio a = 0.46  (layer thickness  = 0.15 
m) Film opening  Diagonal view 
“HyTunnel” – Main Experiments  
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Detonation cell on the 
ceiling of the box  
Detonation cell on the side 
wall of the box  
Observed averaged cell 
sizes vary within  
1.5 – 1.7 cm 
~ corresponds to 
theoretical expectations 
“HyTunnel” – Smoked-foil records 
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• Large scale test completed 
• Effective flame acceleration (FA) depends on mixture 
reactivity and gas layer thickness.  
Flame accelerates to sonic velocity: 
  for 15% H2 d  0.6 m  
  for 20% H2 d  0.3 m  
• Detonation in semi-confined geometry at 25% H2 can occur 
if gas layer d  0.3 m       
• Critical layer thickness for detonation propagation:  
    15 > d/l > 7.5  
“HyTunnel” - Some results  
regarding FA and DDT 
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“HyTunnel” Simulations 
Flammable 
cloud of a  
5kg release 
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Experience from space research/rocket engineering 
indicates that hydrogen 5.0 with less than 5ppm O2 
contamination  
(HPH2, as required for PEM FC) can induce accelerated 
material damage processes. 
Objectives: 
• Investigation of the effect of HPH2 induced cracking 
• Recommendations for the safety aspects of the use of 
HPH2 in fuel cell cars 
Lead: AL Partners: BAM, DNV, HSE/HSL, INASMET, Risø  
and Active Supporters: ET, INTA.  
WP18.3 Effect of high purity high pressure 
hydrogen on structural material 
Objectives 
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Comparison 
between pure gas 
and H2 with 
additives [4] 
WP18.3 High Purity H2  
Some results of a literature study 
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Fundamental understanding the safety issues 
regarding nano-scaled solid-state hydrogen 
storage materials/systems through:  
(i) development of standard testing  
techniques to quantitatively  
evaluate both materials and systems,  
(ii)understand the fundamental science 
of environmental reactivity of  
hydrides and 
(iii)develop methods and systems  
to mitigate the risks to acceptable  
levels.  
nano-structured alanate blown out of a heat exchanger tube at 10 bar and 120 °C  
(frames of a high speed video (left) and of a infrared video (right) at the same instant)  
 
WP18.4 Safety of Nano Storage Material 
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Specific Surface by BET-Analysen and TGA analysis 
AlH3 from pyrolysis furnace 2.59 m
2/g 
AlH3 in TGA*   15 to 20 m
2/g 
 
AlH3 (original crystals)  0.69 m
2/g 
ALEX (nano-Al)   12.28 m2/g 
5 µm Aluminum (ALCAN)  1,36 m2/g 
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*estimated from mass increase by 
oxidation 
  with a passivation layer of 3 nm 
formation of 
Al2O3  
passivation 
layer 
chemical 
controlled 
particle  
oxidation 
chemical 
and diffusion 
controlled 
particle  
oxidation 
Progress status WP18.4 
Methods of investigation: decomposition – oxidation 
Methods of Thermal Analysis: 
DSC, TG, X-Ray 
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1) Develop a reference Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
methodology for hydrogen technologies applying – where necessary - 
simplified methods for acceptable answer times as required for an 
engineering tool 
The tool supports the following steps: 
 a. Hazard identification  
 b. Frequency estimation  
 c. Consequence assessments 
 d. Risk estimation  
 e. Validation of acceptance criteria  
 f. Assessment of measures for risk reduction 
2) Prototypical validation at few relevant cases of the developed 
methodology 
HySafe Internal Project “HyQRA”  
Objectives 
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HyQRA  
The project structure 
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HyQRA Benchmark Base Case  
Geometry of the HRS - BBC 
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• determination of tolerable H2 releases during vehicle repair, which pose no risk to 
the personnel, 
• design of effective and low-cost ventilation systems, 
• CFD analysis of leaking hydrogen scenarios, including complex surroundings 
near the vehicle, extension of the investigations described in [33] and including 
the special features of a LH2 leak including cold jets, 
• control of ignition sources and definition of a realistic conservative ignition model, 
• in case of filling stations, the issues of protecting walls and safety distances need 
to be investigated. 
State of the Art in Infrastructure Safety  
Open issues 
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• measurement of ignitable space regions, given a certain leak size, shape, and 
mass flow rate, an extension of the work described in, 
• systematic investigation of active and passive safety systems, e.g. ventilators, 
catalytic recombiners, or flame arrestors, 
• modelling of ignition processes under realistic boundary conditions, 
• investigation of diffusion flame stability after ignition (limits for lift-off and 
extinction), 
• criteria for flame acceleration and detonation onset in H2-air mixtures with 
concentration gradients and partial confinement (Note: the criteria described in 
Section 3.2 are valid for homogeneous and fully confined mixtures; they are, 
hence, very conservative with respect to practical accident conditions in mobile 
applications and should be extended to more prototypic conditions). 
• basic investigations of the gas behaviour including its reactions at the very low 
temperatures around 20K and very high pressures 
• effect of high purity hydrogen on the relevant materials 
State of the Art in Basic Research  
Open issues 
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Other References 
H2 Testing – EIHP2 (www.eihp.org) 
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A simulation contributions to the EC project  HyApproval „Handbook for the safe 
installation/operation of a HRS“ (details on http://www.hyapproval.org)  
Other References 
HRS Handbook – HyApproval (www.hyapproval.org) 
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Other References 
HyPer – Permitting Guidelines for small  
stationary installations (www.hyperproject.eu) 
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State of the Art Education 
Online reviewed curriculum (HySafe e-Academy) 
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Other Education and Training Offers 
PGC and Summer School (HySafe e-Academy) 
http://www.ehammertraining.us/energy/hydrogen/controller.cfm 
for details see 
http://www.hysafe.net/eAcademy 
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Invitation to the 3rd Int. Conf. on Hydrogen Safety 
 September 16-18th, 2009 
 Ajaccio, Corse, France 
Contact: ICHS@hysafe.org 
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Support 
NoE HySafe is co-funded by the European Commission  
within the 6th Framework Programme (2002-2006); 
Contract n°: SES6-CT-2004-502630. 
 
The network is contributing to the implementation of the  
Key Action "Integrating and strengthening the ERA" within 
the Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development. 
 
Thanks to all HySafe colleagues… 
 
… and thank you for your attention. 
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TURBULENT DEFLAGRATION EXPERIMENT WITHOUT DDT 
• Partially obstructed tube with conus, 15 % hydrogen in air 
5
 m
 
350 mm 
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TURBULENT DEFLAGRATION EXPERIMENT WITH DDT 
• Partially obstructed tube with conus, 16.5 % hydrogen in air 
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BLAST LOADED ELASTIC OSCILLATOR (1) 
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• Solution  
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• Damage is determined by maximum displacement xmax, 
  can be found from solution by setting x(t) = 0 
 
• Scaled displacement = f(scaled loading time) 
)Tf( 
/kp
x
load
max 
 
k 
m 
t 
x 
loadT/t
ep)t(p
- 
t 
p(t) 
p+ 
. 
s
c
a
le
d
 d
e
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 x
m
a
x
/(
P
 /
 k
)
scaled loading time T
m
k
T 
.
T = 1 ms 5 ms
s
c
a
le
d
 d
e
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 x
m
a
x
/(
P
 /
 k
)
Belfast, 30th September 2008 Progress in Hydrogen Safety – Hydrogen Safety SoA – T. Jordan 113 
BLAST LOADED ELASTIC OSCILLATOR (2) 
• Asymptotes for maximum deflection /deformation 
  can be computed from energy balances 
 
• Quasistatic loading real m (T load >>Tosc) 
  - strain energy = work on structure 
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• Impulsive loading real m ( T load << Tosc) 
   - kinetic energy (t=0) = strain energy 
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OSCILLATOR RESPONSE: ANOTHER VIEW 
• Often oscillator response is presented with inverted ordinate and unscaled load parameters  
   p+ and Tload 
• Quasistatic asymptote 
 
Maximum deflagration xmax is only proportional to 
applied peak overpressure p+, indipendent of load 
duration 
• Impulsive asymptote 
 
Maximum deflagration xmax is proportional 
to applied impulse 
possitive peak 
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Internal Project “HyTunnel”  
 
 
 
 
 • Accidents in public focus 
• Heterogenous regulations 
• Costly and long term 
investments 
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Tunnel 2D-geometry of gas mixture with one solid 
wall is assumed to be semi-confined volume with 
venting ratio  a = 0.5 
• FA criterion: s/s0 ~ 1+2·a 
• FA estimation for different a:  
a = 40% => fast deflagration in 25% H2/air 
a = 50% => fast deflagration in 30% H2/air 
• DDT estimation for different d:  
• DDT criterion: d/l ~ ? 
 
“HyTunnel” - Some Experimental 
Work   
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Small scale facility (1.6 x 0.5 x 0.4 m) 
Metal grid 
Photodiodes 
“HyTunnel” - Pretests   
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BOS 15 % H2/air w/o obstacles 
Flame velocity vs. distance 
“HyTunnel” – Small Scale Tests 
Results   
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HyApproval – HRS 
Worst Case Numerical Simulation 
CGH2 Refuelling Station Side View (Luxembourg refuelling station)  
Assume all contents lost 
- 250 kg H2 released 
- ~ 10 min release time 
- ~ 1.3 kg/s initial release rate 
Leak location 
Scenario T1:  
Trailer hose  
disconnection 
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Scenario T1: Hydrogen concentration  
Iso-surface 4% H2  
Iso-surface 15% H2  
Iso-surface 30% H2  Concentration distribution at 6.8 s 
after the beginning of the release  
Concentration distribution is imported 
from GASFLOW 
 
Grid was modified from 60x60x50 to  
120x120x100 (with total 1.44·106 cells) 
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Scenario T1: Pressure wave evolution during detonation 
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Scenario T1: Pressure loads 
Pressure ‘transducers’ 
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Scenario T1: Pressure loads 
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